Review what humans miss
Render invisible and bidirectional controls as explicit code points.
Find AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, Cursor, Copilot, Gemini, and Windsurf rules across a public repository. Review hidden Unicode, remote execution, secret handling, destructive commands, and safety bypasses without running any repository code.
8
risk signals
40
file cap
0
commands run
Deterministic early-warning checks can miss malicious intent and can flag legitimate maintenance commands. Every match requires human review.
Add the same eight deterministic checks to pull requests. The zero-dependency action adds line annotations, a job summary, and a JSON plus SARIF report without a token, network call, or telemetry.
name: Agent instruction security
on:
pull_request:
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
scan:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: sunxiayi/repo-agent-instruction-security-scan@v1Run the reviewed v1.1.2 release directly from GitHub. It needs no account, token, global install, or dependency installation, and it executes none of the instruction content it reads.
Text
Readable line findings
JSON
Machine-readable evidence
SARIF
Code-scanning compatible
npx --yes github:sunxiayi/repo-agent-instruction-security-scan#v1.1.2 .
SARIF for code scanning
npx --yes github:sunxiayi/repo-agent-instruction-security-scan#v1.1.2 . --fail-on medium --format sarif --output agent-instructions.sarif
Validated pre-commit hook
repos:
- repo: https://github.com/sunxiayi/repo-agent-instruction-security-scan
rev: v1.1.2
hooks:
- id: repo-agent-instruction-security-scanCI validates the manifest and installs this immutable release in an isolated Node environment. Pin the full reviewed commit when your policy requires a commit-SHA boundary.
Versioned package · 11.0 KB
Verify before installing:
SHA-256 e99ad514e8c03aa82eb5bdf6213eb8cf1d75c1426e0ccd377e1643e7d236ea9cThreat boundary
Coding agents can execute commands, read files, and call external services. Instructions embedded in repository content can influence those actions, so static review should happen before trust—not after execution.
Read the secure deployment guidanceRender invisible and bidirectional controls as explicit code points.
Flag instructions that pair sensitive material with outbound transfer or broad access.
Surface commands and language that weaken sandbox, confirmation, or review boundaries.
A match is a focused review prompt, not proof of malicious intent. Install scripts, maintenance commands, and credential guidance can be legitimate when they are narrow and independently reviewed.
A clean result is not a security guarantee. Static patterns cannot establish provenance, detect every indirect instruction, or prove that runtime permissions and network controls are safe.